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In past ten years or so, many economists and social sci-
entists have strongly argued that modern Western soci-
eties are moving in the direction of a society dominated 
by the production and use of knowledge, of a ‘knowl-
edge society’. This assumption has urged politicians 
from the right and the left to advocate a substantial 
change of the socio-economic and educational policies 
of their countries, and to stimulate their constituencies 
to improve their knowledge and learning skills in order 
not to miss the boat. In 2000, the leaders of the Euro-
pean Union at a summit in Lisbon even declared that 
the central aim of the Union’s socio-economic policy 
should be to become ‘the most dynamic and competi-
tive knowledge based economy’ in the next ten years. 
But what exactly is a ‘knowledge based economy’ and 
a ‘knowledge society’?
In this article, we argue that there is no such thing as 
the knowledge society. Like many others authors, we 
claim that the fundamental transformations of our time 
can be typified as the end of the national ‘industrial so-
ciety’ and the move towards some kind of global soci-
ety in which the production and use of ‘knowledge’ is 
of vital importance. However, since there are more than 
one type of knowledge and since the emerging global 
society will be characterised by a global division of la-
bour, these transformations not necessarily produce a 
convergence of national and regional socio-economic 
structures, but rather the advancement of at least three 
different types of knowledge societies.
In Section 2, 3 and 4 of this article, we argue that 
in industrial society two types of knowledge were 
dominant: ‘technical knowledge’ and ‘social knowl-
edge’. Industrial society was based on and aimed at 
the ‘homogenisation’ of subjects, but at the same time 
produced at least two diversifying processes: reflexivi-
sation and globalisation. The growing diverseness of 
individual and group identities produced by these proc-
esses and the advancement of information technologies 
calls for the development and application of a new type 
of knowledge: ‘cultural knowledge’. In Section 5, we 
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analyse the consequences of the increased significance 
of cultural knowledge in the economic sphere by using 
the Marxian concepts ‘technical’ and ‘social division 
of labour’. Combining the notions of different knowl-
edge types and a global division of labour, in Section 
6 we conceptualise three different types of knowledge 
societies: ‘the techno-cultural’, ‘the socio-cultural’ and 
the ‘socio-technical knowledge society’. Finally, in 
Section 7 we will portray three ‘categories’ of trailblaz-
ers of the knowledge societies, new professionals that 
perform ‘meta business functions’. These trailblazers 
directly or indirectly create new value chains by link-
ing or destroying existing ones, and breaking up others 
in to pieces in order to create new combinations. These 
professionals, in other words, actively manage value 
chains.
Industrial society and the development
of techno-social knowledge
Max Weber, and more recently Ullrich Beck have 
claimed that the central quest of industrial society was 
the control of nature and social life. The control was to 
be made possible by what Weber (1922, 1968) calls the 
‘disenchantment of the world’. With the concept of dis-
enchantment, Weber refers to human contemplation as 
well as social action. By analysing nature and social life 
in a scientific way, knowledge could be accumulated 
and subsequently applied in several control strategies. 
In the sphere of nature, the quest for control became 
manifest in the mechanised production of goods and 
services, in the social sphere in the development of the 
nation state and its instruments (welfare state, state bu-
reaucracy, etc.). Thus, the development and application 
of knowledge is not unique for our current ‘knowledge 
society’. Some authors (Bell, 1973; Giddens, 1994a) 
even argue that all human societies in history were at 
least partly founded on the development and applica-
tion of knowledge. Why then do we label our current 
society a ‘knowledge society’?
In order to be able to answer this question, we first 
have to distinguish two ideal types of knowledge that 
were dominant in industrial society: ‘technical knowl-
edge’ and ‘social knowledge’. Technical knowledge 
concerns the knowledge of (the functioning of) non-hu-
man objects, of what Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990, 
1994a) call ‘nature’. The scientific disciplines that are 
concerned with these objects are the natural sciences, 
and the application of this type of knowledge is at the 
foundation of the industrial production. Social knowl-
edge is the knowledge of (the functioning of) social 
‘groups’. The term group refers to a collective of indi-
viduals who 1) interact and communicate, and 2) share 
a certain set of values and norms. The latter means that 
a ‘group’ to a certain extend is culturally homogene-
ous. The scientific disciplines that are concerned with 
groups are the social sciences, and the application of 
this type of knowledge is at the foundation of, for in-
stance, the nation state.
On the basis of these two types of knowledge, 
another ideal type of knowledge can be discerned, a 
type that is at the intersection of technical and social 
knowledge: ‘techno-social knowledge’. Techno-social 
knowledge concerns the knowledge of the interaction 
between non-human objects and groups. Examples of 
this knowledge type are Taylorism and Fordism. Both 
Taylorism and Fordism were developed at the begin-
ning of the 20th century and try to formulate an an-
swer to the question how in the mechanical production 
of goods, machines (‘nature’) and workers (‘group’) 
could efficiently be geared to one another. One could 
claim that techno-social knowledge was at the core of 
industrial society, since the central institutions of in-
dustrial society – capitalism, bureaucracy, nation state 
(Weber, 1968) – eventually could not function, and the 
quest for control could not succeed, without the inte-
gration of nature and social life.
Though especially at the beginning of the mod-
ernisation process the central institutions of industrial 
society were confronted with populations that origi-
nated from local communities that culturally differed 
substantially, the institutions in principle were directed 
at subjects (‘citizens’, ‘classes’, ‘sexes’, etc.) that were 
to a certain extend culturally homogeneous. Moreo-
ver, according to some authors the institutions exerted 
a strong homogenising influence on their subjects: the 
institutions ‘rationalised’ (Weber, 1968), ‘disciplined’ 
(Foucault, 1977), and ‘normalised’ (De Swaan, 1989) 
social life in industrial society in such a way that the 
cultural diversity inside the nation state, the factory, bu-
reaucracy, etc. disappeared, or at least was pushed into 
the background.
Technology, knowledge and information
as diversifying forces
The homogenising project of industrial society was 
however never completed. Even more than that: though 
the central institutions of industrial society aimed at 
wiping out cultural differences, in at least two ways 
they evoked a further ‘diversification’ of their subjects. 
To a certain extend, behind both of these diversifying 
processes is technological innovation and a spread of 
knowledge.
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The first diversifying process caused by the institu-
tions of industrial society is ‘globalisation’. In the past 
few decades, the development of capitalism gradually 
evoked a further scaling-up of the industrial production. 
A prerequisite for this process is, what Harvey (1989) 
calls ‘time-space compression’. This concept refers to 
the increased mobility and internationalisation of capi-
tal. In the process of capitalist modernisation, the pace 
of the economic process is gradually speeded-up by 
the removal of spatial barriers through the application 
of new technologies. By these innovations the ‘spatial 
rigidities’ of Fordist production, in which capital was 
held to be loyal to a place, were removed and time was 
so to speak ‘compressed’, making it much easier and 
quicker to move information and capital from one place 
of earth to the other. 
In practise, two main drivers of time-space com-
pression can be identified. The first is the technological 
development of transportation. By the invention of the 
train, the ocean steamer, the airplane and the automo-
bile, and a gradual extension and of the rail roads and 
highway network in the 19th and 20th century, more 
and more local economies on earth could be absorbed 
in the global economic process. In the West, the conse-
quences of the technological innovations were first felt 
in the 1960s and 1970s, when ‘traditional’ industrial 
sectors like textile and shipbuilding were swept away 
by new manufacturers from East-Asia. The second 
main driver behind time-space compression was the 
technological development of communication. Inven-
tions like the telegraph, the telephone, radio, television 
and the Internet made possible a further integration of 
the global economy, not only by facilitating the com-
petition between producers from all over the globe, but 
more recently also by providing the information neces-
sary for companies to transferred the production to that 
country or region that can produce at the lowest com-
parative costs. Thus, by the end of 1970s, globalisation 
aroused a first ‘wave’ of change towards what we now 
call a ‘knowledge society’. In the West, this first wave 
was characterised by a rapid ‘informatisation’, the flex-
ibilisation of the work organisation, and the outsourc-
ing of several business functions to developing coun-
tries, mainly in East-Asia (see also Section Cultural 
knowledge types and the division of labour). 
But technological innovation not only causes glo-
balisation and integration on the side of the producers. 
By absorbing local economies from all over the globe 
in the economic process, more and more cultural com-
munities become part of the capitalist system as well. 
In the initial phase of globalisation, the members of 
these communities only served as producers for a still 
rather homogeneous Western consumer market, but 
in the last few decades they have more and more be-
come customers on the global market themselves. For 
the producers this development has enormous effects. 
As a consequence of globalisation, the potential mar-
ket for their products has expanded dramatically, but 
at the same time the homogeneity and transparency of 
consumer demand, which was so typical for the Ford-
ist era, gradually disappears, since their clientele is no 
longer culturally homogeneous.
The latter development was further intensified by a 
second diversifying process that, at least up to now, is 
very typical for the ‘developed’ Western countries: ‘re-
flexivisation’. Giddens argues that reflexivisation is the 
outcome of large-scale processes, which were also in 
effect in industrial society, but have come to maturity 
in the last few decades. One of these processes is the 
enormous spreading of knowledge. According to Gid-
dens, in traditional local society the production and de-
velopment of knowledge had been monopolised by the 
so-called ‘guardians of truth’, mostly priests. Their task 
and privilege was to integrate past, present and future in 
a coherent system of knowledge of the natural environ-
ment, the meaning of the community and the assigned 
tasks of the individual members. The knowledge system 
was presented to community members as ‘traditions’, 
ritual guidelines for all aspects of social life that were 
sacred and unquestionable, and were to be followed by 
the members in a thoughtless way (Giddens, 1994a).
In the process of modernisation, the monopoly of 
these ‘guardians’ was slowly but surely dissolved. Na-
tion-states forced local communities to open up, while 
national governments introduced compulsory educa-
tion with the objective of fostering economic devel-
opment and thus actively stimulated the spreading of 
knowledge. Though the application of knowledge in 
industrial society was no longer the monopoly of privi-
leged elites, the evaluation of knowledge as truth re-
mained the domain of ‘higher’ institutions like modern 
science and state bureaucracies. These institutions in-
herited the ‘aura of authority’ the knowledge-produc-
ing elites in traditional societies once possessed (Gid-
dens, 1994a: 56-109, 86-87). As a consequence of a 
second large-scale process, the disintegration of social 
ties, traditional forms of authority disappear and indi-
viduals finally start to think for themselves. Our current 
‘post-traditional’ world, Giddens claims, ‘is a world of 
clever people’, who actively reflect on their actions and 
those of others, and no longer take prefabricated ration-
al knowledge for granted (Giddens, 1994b: 7, 1990, 
1994a). Thus, reflexivisation is also interpreted by 
Giddens as a process of ‘individualisation’. The grow-
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ing knowledge of nature and social life, he suggests, 
enables individuals to exceed social structures and cul-
ture and make their own choices (Giddens, 1994b: 6; 
Hoogenboom – Ossewaarde, 2005). 
To sum up, by time-space compression more and 
more cultural communities are gradually integrated 
into one single economic system. Though without 
completely removing the cultural differences between 
these communities, globalisation poses the challenge 
of surmounting cultural differences in the exchange of 
goods and services. This economic challenge is also 
felt in the production of commodities, since the 
simultaneous scaling-up of transportation and the 
mass media also removes the spatial rigidities of 
people to physically and virtually move across 
vast distances, creating one single (partly virtual) 
production system.
The processes of reflexivisation and globalisa-
tion that were produced by the central institutions 
of industrial society gradually undermine the ho-
mogeneity these institutions were based on and 
aimed at, and aroused a second ‘wave’ of change 
towards a ‘knowledge society’. Whereas the first 
wave of change was characterised by informati-
sation and flexibilisation, the second wave can 
be typified as ‘cultural fragmentation’. While in 
industrial society, the pursuit of collective objec-
tives (welfare, security, etc.) was facilitated by a 
set of values and norms, that was shared by all 
members of the community, in the current soci-
ety values and norms are fragmentised, and the 
pursuit of certain objectives has become highly 
complicated by a growing diversity of subjects. Since 
the homogeneity of industrial society gradually disap-
pears, new types of knowledge are needed to bridge 
different individual and group identities.
The rise of cultural knowledge types
In our society, as a consequence of the diversification 
of subject identities a third type of knowledge becomes 
more significant: ‘cultural knowledge’ (Figure 1). Cul-
tural knowledge refers to the knowledge of identities 
different from the own identity. From the fact that in 
knowledge society diversity comes from two sources 
(reflexivisation and globalisation), it can be concluded 
that in theory cultural knowledge can take two forms. 
The first form consists in the knowledge of individual 
identities in a society that is characterised by reflexive 
individuals. The obtainment of this form of cultural 
knowledge requires certain psychological capacities 
like empathy (cf. Giddens, 1992). In our current society, 
this type of knowledge is required on all levels of eco-
nomic life, especially on the level where the producer 
meets the customer ‘in the flesh’, for instance in the de-
partment store. The second form of cultural knowledge 
concerns the knowledge of other group identities, that is 
the norms and values of other culturally homogeneous 
groups. The obtainment of this form of cultural knowl-
edge requires certain anthropological capacities. In the 
economic process, we can observe the need for this type 
of knowledge in the appointment of cultural anthropol-
ogists in multi-national business companies.
The increased significance of cultural knowledge goes 
hand in hand with the increased significance of two 
further types of knowledge: ‘socio-cultural knowledge’ 
and ‘techno-cultural knowledge’. Socio-cultural knowl-
edge refers to the knowledge of the ways in which dif-
ferences between individual and group identities can be 
bridged. This type of knowledge somewhat resembles 
Castells’ concept of ‘hypertext’. In his analysis of the 
‘network society’, Castells claims that as a consequence 
of the annihilation of time and space in our time, sym-
bolic interaction loses its reference to experience and 
‘culture’ becomes individualised. ‘Thus, because there 
are few common codes’, Castells (2000: 21.) argues, 
‘there is systemic misunderstanding. It is this induced 
cacophony that is celebrated as postmodernity. Howev-
er, there is one common language, the language of the 
hypertext. Cultural expressions left out of the hypertext 
are purely individual experiences. The hypertext is the 
vehicle of communication, thus the provider of shared 
cultural codes.’
Figure 1
Ideal types of knowledge
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The question however remains if in reality a single, 
non-cultural hypertext, as it is conceptualised by Cas-
tells, is imaginable. In fact, Castells not only presuppos-
es a universality that (maybe apart from mathematics) 
is hardly feasible, he also suggests that the existence of 
plural hypertexts is not possible. In our interpretation, 
socio-cultural knowledge is not necessarily universal, 
but only serves the goal of bridging the misunderstand-
ing between some individual or group identities on a 
given moment in a given context. Thus, socio-cultural 
knowledge requires the capacity of constant (re-) in-
terpretation of identities and is an endless search for 
the ways in which these identities can communicate. 
In international business, workers assigned to the task 
of ‘inter-cultural management’ are supposed to exhibit 
this type of knowledge. 
Finally, techno-cultural knowledge concerns the 
knowledge of the ways in which non-human things (‘na-
ture’) can be tuned to more than one individual or group 
identity, and vice versa. The word ‘techno’ in the concept 
might seem to be a little bit misleading, since the sheer 
workings of a certain technology itself can in most cases 
not be adapted to a specific individual or group identity. 
By techno-cultural knowledge is, however, meant the 
knowledge that is necessary to apply a given technology 
in such away that it can produce different mental and/or 
physical products for individuals or groups with diver-
gent identities. An example is the ‘Smart’ car, which to 
a certain extend can be adapted to the individual desires 
of the modern reflexive customer, or the ‘hallal burger’ 
McDonalds offers in Islamic countries.
Cultural knowledge types and 
the division of labour
We can analyse the consequences of the increased sig-
nificance of cultural, socio-cultural and techno-cultural 
knowledge in the economic process by applying the 
Marxian distinction between the ‘social division of la-
bour’ (‘Teilung der Arbeit’) and the ‘technical division 
of labour’ (‘Verteilung der Arbeit’). The technical divi-
sion of labour refers to the splitting up of tasks in the 
production process into smaller parts that are performed 
by a single individual or a single collective of individu-
als. In the production of a certain good or service within 
a single business company, the technical division of la-
bour results in a ‘materialisation’ of business functions 
(1): the emergence of separate offices and/or depart-
ments responsible for the performance of one or a series 
of related business functions. If the performance of a 
certain business function becomes more complicated 
and the costs rise, a process of specialisation is likely to 
set in. Separate business companies or completely new 
sectors will emerge that concentrate on the performance 
of a certain business function or a series of related busi-
ness functions and that gradually take over the perform-
ance of that function from non-specialised companies: 
social division of labour. Through the social division of 
labour, new commodities and value chains emerge. Ac-
cording to classical sociologists like Smith, Marx and 
Durkheim, this division of labour type was one of the 
main engines behind the process of modernisation and 
the rise of industrial society. 
In the production of many goods and services, re-
flexivisation and globalisation ‘create’ new business 
functions. The production of commodities, manage-
ment, marketing, sale, etc. in an increasing degree 
require the development and application of cultural, 
socio-cultural and techno-cultural knowledge. If the 
complexity of the required knowledge is low, the ap-
plication simple, and thus the costs relatively low, busi-
ness companies can create their own in-house facilities 
in the form of specialised offices and/or units: technical 
division of labour. However, if the required knowledge 
becomes more complex and the costs rise, the busi-
ness functions that require these types of knowledge 
are, like in the early phases of the modernizing process, 
gradually ‘outsourced’ to new specialised companies: 
social division of labour. Here, it might be fruitful to 
make a distinction between two types of outsourcing: 
‘technical outsourcing’ and ‘social outsourcing’. Tech-
nical outsourcing concerns all kinds of outsourcing; 
social outsourcing or ‘offshore outsourcing’ refers to 
technical outsourcing that implies the transfer of busi-
ness functions to ‘oversees’ regions.
Thus, the increased significance of cultural, techno-
cultural and socio-cultural knowledge generates chang-
es in the economic structure on three levels. Here, we 
will only analyse a few of these change briefly.
On the micro level, the level of the business compa-
ny, the technical division of labour induces fundamental 
changes in work organisations and individual job de-
scriptions. Since the development and application of the 
cultural knowledge types are transferred to specialised 
offices or units, not only new jobs are created, but exist-
ing jobs change too. And since the cultural knowledge 
types imply a continuing re-interpretation of identities 
and an endless search for the ways in which these identi-
ties can communicate, all positions responsible for the 
development and application of the cultural knowledge 
types require a large amount of flexibility and life-long 
learning (more on the micro level and the organisation of 
work in Sections Conceptualising knowledge societies 
and The making of knowledge societies: trailblazers). 
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On the meso level, the level of the ‘national’ or ‘re-
gional economy’ (as far as these can still be discerned 
in a global economy), technical outsourcing produces 
a social division of labour and severe changes in the 
economic structure. This implies the emergence of 
new economic sectors specialised in the performance 
of business functions related to the development and 
application of the cultural knowledge types. The new 
social division of labour affects all spheres (social, cul-
tural and political) of life, and in the economic sphere 
generates the emergence of new value chains.
Finally, on the macro level, the level of the global 
economy, social outsourcing induces a global divi-
sion of labour and the emergence of new global value 
chains. In the process, not only the social and economic 
structures of the outsourcing ‘regions’ are transformed, 
but also the social and economic life in the regions that 
take over the outsourced business functions. The new 
global division of labour facilitates, maybe even en-
forces, the development of ‘mono-knowledge econo-
mies’, specialised in the development and/or applica-
tion of a specific knowledge type.
Conceptualising knowledge societies
The increased significance of cultural, socio-cultural 
en techno-cultural knowledge has turned industrial so-
ciety into a ‘knowledge society’. From the analysis in 
Section 3, 4 and 5, we can however conclude that there 
has to be made a distinction between different types of 
knowledge societies. First, we have to distinguish be-
tween the ‘knowledge society in a broad sense’ and the 
‘knowledge society in a narrow sense’ (Figure 2). 
The knowledge society in a broad sense refers to 
the global society as a whole. The knowledge society 
in a narrow sense, concerns a part of global society that 
has specialised in the development and/or application 
of a specific knowledge type. Second, since we have 
discerned three main types of knowledge, we have to 
distinguish between three types of the knowledge soci-
ety in a narrow sense (see Figure 2 and Table 1).
Knowledge society in a broad sense
Of the four knowledge society types we have 
discerned, the knowledge society in the broad sense is 
the most difficult to conceptualize, since it is composed 
of at least three types of knowledge societies in the 
narrow sense. The global knowledge society might 
however be called a knowledge society, since one of its 
main organising principles is the division of labour on 
the basis of knowledge. 
Ideally, a business function is transferred to and 
performed in that country or region that can produce at 
the lowest comparative costs and is specialised in the 
production and/or application of a certain knowledge 
type that is required for the performance of the busi-
ness function. This social division of labour is made 
possible by the application of new communication and 
transport technologies.
Knowledge society in a narrow sense (1): 
techno-cultural knowledge society
The techno-cultural knowledge society might 
be characterised as the ‘real’ successor of industrial 
society. To a certain extend, this society type is the 
materialisation of Ritzers (1993) ‘McDonalisation’: the 
ability to efficiently apply the knowledge of 
‘nature’ is combined with the capacity to gear 
this application to the variety of individual and 
group identities on the global market. 
Also in the organisation of the production, 
the techno-cultural knowledge society shows a 
Janus face. On the one hand, the inclination of 
industrial society to efficiency is recognisable 
in the continuous quest for a further technical 
division of labour and the perfection of the 
Fordism model. On the other hand, the techno-
cultural knowledge society is characterised by 
high-qualified and culture-sensitive capacities, 
necessary for the continuing adaptation to new 
consumers’ demands. As far as the organisa-
tion of work is concerned (see Table 1), this 
combination requires a flexibilisation of the 
‘traditional’ Fordist corporation. The result 
might be called ‘neo-Fordism’ (Gottfried, 
Figure 2
Knowledge types and knowledge societies
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1995): a capital-intensive and very flexible organisa-
tion with nevertheless a high degree of technical divi-
sion of labour. 
The hero of the techno-cultural knowledge society is 
Sennett’s (1998) ‘flexible man’. His or her restlessness, 
ability to adapt to constantly changing circumstances, 
and lack of commitment to any community makes this 
knowledge society the most dynamic of the three types. 
Under these circumstances, ‘communities’ are mostly 
temporary and not really able to impose the necessary 
‘solidarity’ (Durkheim, 1947) on its ‘members’. This 
lack of binding force is however compensated by the 
invisible disciplinary power of the ‘social structures’ 
of the techno-cultural knowledge society as a whole 
(Foucault, 1977). In terms of social stratification, this 
society type is a true ‘meritocracy’, furnishing those 
with a minimum of knowledge of the technological hy-
pertext and an antenna for superficial cultural similari-
ties with status and wealth. 
Knowledge society in a narrow sense (2): 
socio-cultural knowledge society
The second type of the knowledge society in a narrow 
sense might be characterised as the service society 
(Bell, 1973; Touraine, 1974) par excellence. At a first 
glance, it seems that this knowledge society is ‘beyond’ 
the production of real goods. At the core of this society 
type is the production of intangible things – trust, 
communication channels, images, emotions – making 
it very difficult to discern highly valuable commodities 
from hot air. The development and application of 
knowledge in this society type hardly requires large 
capital investments. Knowledge is produced and used 
in small and ad hoc ‘organizations’ and in networks, 
and certain high-skilled business functions that were 
split up in the industrial era, are re-integrated. A high 
percentage of the working force is not even working in 
organisation at all, but is self-employed (see Table 1).
The dominant social stratum in this knowledge so-
ciety type somewhat resembles Florida’s (2002) ‘crea-
tive class’: consultants, artists, musicians, architects, 
journalists, social scientists, and the like (2). The most 
valuable tool of this stratum is its ‘cultural capital’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984), that is: a thorough understanding of 
cultural meanings and differences, but also the presence 
of the right ‘habitus’. As Bourdieu knew, the acquisi-
tion of cultural capital is much more difficult and time-
intensive than the obtainment of economic and even 
social capital. Accordingly, in this knowledge society 
type the rat race for economic success and social recog-
nition already starts in the cradle, giving the offspring 
of the culturally gifted a head start. In order to keep 
up, also in adult life a permanent training is required, 
not only through formal education, but through virtu-
ally all activities performed during the waking hours of 
the day. Consequently, in the socio-cultural knowledge 
society the boundaries between work and private life 
have been completely blurred. Maybe this is why this 
knowledge society type is easily mistaken for a ‘post-
materialist society’ (Inglehart, 1977). Formally, the 
working week is relatively short, but in practise work 
goes on during lunch and diner, the evening visits to 
the movies and the theatre, and even during vacations 
to distant places. 
In terms of social stratification, the socio-cultural 
knowledge society is a hybrid, in which status posi-
tion, economic position and power position tend to 
fuse. Since social, cultural and economic life are hardly 
separable, cultural capital is easily convertible into so-
cial and economic capital, and vice versa – maybe in 
this knowledge society it is not even sensible to make a 
distinction between the three capital types. As a conse-
quence, in the socio-cultural knowledge society there is 
a sharp dichotomy in the economy, in politics as well as 
in cultural life between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, and 
hardly any jobs for those who lack a minimum amount 
of cultural knowledge.
Knowledge society in a narrow sense (3): 
techno-social knowledge society
Finally, the techno-social knowledge society is 
specialised in the development and application of the 
knowledge types required for the production of mass 
consumer goods. This is the reason why this type of 
knowledge society might also be called the ‘new 
industrial society’. With its concentration on large-scale 
industrial production and its Fordist organisation of the 
production process, it highly resembles the industrial 
society of the early phases of the modernising process 
in the West. Initially, in the first wave of change (see 
Section “Technology, knowledge and information as 
diversifying forces”), this society type was the result of 
the process of social outsourcing of business functions 
that require low-skills and had become too expensive 
in the other knowledge society types. In the second 
wave of change (see Section “Technology, knowledge 
and information as diversifying forces”), the phase of 
cultural fragmentation, the techno-social knowledge 
society however develops into a mature knowledge 
society in its own right. Since the development and 
application of techno-social knowledge have become 
too expensive and, to a certain extend, unnecessary 
in the other knowledge society types (as they have 
specialised in the development and application of the 
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other knowledge types), this knowledge society type 
can eventually outstrip the other two in the development 
of new efficient and cheap techno-social organisation 
forms. This is why this society type might be called the 
new industrial society. 
However, compared to the other knowledge society 
types, the techno-social type can hardly be labelled a 
knowledge society, since its labour market is charac-
terised by a low demand for high-skilled and a high 
demand for low-skilled (and low-paid) workers. The 
latter are working in highly rationalised production 
processes, and are subject to alienation and exploita-
tion. The organisation of work in the techno-social 
knowledge society is characterised by extreme degrees 
of technical division of labour (see Table 1). The quest 
of the ‘old’ industrial society to efficiently tune tech-
nology to the capacities of workers and vice versa is 
in the new one intensified. New ‘neo-Taylorist’ tech-
niques are developed in order to produce faster and 
cheaper in a extremely competitive environment. The 
result is a further de-skilling of the vast majority of the 
working force.
For us, the inhabitants of the early 21st century 
with still one foot in industrial society, it is tempting 
to identify the three knowledge society types with spe-
cific regions on the globe. The American West Coast 
and Japan with their successful high-tech sectors would 
for instance be perfect examples of the techno-cultural 
knowledge society, North-western Europe with its crea-
tive industries of the socio-cultural variant, and the new 
industrial areas in China and India of the techno-social 
type. For many Westerners, it might even be reassuring 
to divide the world in a capitalist ‘centre’ of luxury, 
culture and safety, and a ‘periphery’ of poverty and ex-
ploitation (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980). But with the near-
ing death of distance (Cairncross, 1997) and the ever 
growing mobility of labour, the new industrial society 
is already on their doorsteps – and in the coming dec-
ades it will probably even enter their homes.
The making of knowledge societies: trailblazers
Though the emergence of the knowledge society types 
is the result of a series of long-term social processes 
that can hardly be influenced by governments and com-
panies, let alone individuals, in reality the new social 
and economic configurations in which the new know-
ledge types are dominant are actually made. While most 
of us can still hardly imagine what the new world we 
are about to enter will look like, in the background real 
Techno-cultural KS
KS in narrow sense (1)
Socio-cultural KS
KS in narrow sense (2)
Techno-social KS
KS in narrow sense (3)
Dominant knowledge type
 Technical
 Techno-cultural
 Cultural
 Social
 Socio-cultural
 Cultural
 Technical
 Techno-social
 Social
Products and services
 Techno-social goods: 
computers, software
 fast food, bio-technology
 Techno-social services: 
banking, web services
 Socio-cultural goods: multi-
culti food, pop music, movies
 Socio-cultural services: 
consultancy, advertisement, 
diplomacy, tourism
 Mass goods:
cars, clothing, toys
 Raw materials:
oil, mining products, meat, grain
Work organisation
 Neo-Fordism
 Re-skilling and de-skilling;
 Life-long learning
 Re-integration of certain 
business functions that require 
high skills; further splitting-
up of business functions that 
require low skills: alienation
 Flexibility, mobility and 
insecurity; exploitation, 
poverty and insecurity
 Dichotomy between high-skilled 
and low-skilled workers
 Networks and self-
employment
 Re-skilling
 Life-long learning
 Re-integration of certain high-
skilled business functions
 Flexibility, mobility and 
insecurity
 Dichotomy between  
high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers; few jobs for  
low-skilled workers
 Post-Taylorism
 De-skilling
 Further splitting-up of  
business functions that 
require low skills: alienation
 Exploitation, poverty and 
insecurity
 Few jobs for high-skilled 
workers
Table 1
Types of knowledge societies (KS) and the organization of work
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people are laying the foundations for this world and in 
a sense act like this world is already in place. They are 
the trailblazers of the knowledge societies.
These trailblazers are the same time the product of 
the old industrial society and the producers of the three 
knowledge society types in the narrow sense, that we 
have conceptualised in the previous section. They are 
the product of industrial society, since they simply per-
form a certain business function in the manufacturing 
of a certain product or service. However, by doing so 
they fundamentally transform the value chains they are 
part of, and reshape the social configurations that they 
touch upon. In the final section of this article, we por-
tray three ‘categories’ of these trailblazers.
Trailblazers of the socio-technical KS: 
economic hit men
The emerging socio-technical knowledge society is 
fuelled by the restless search of large corporations for 
new markets, lower costs and higher profits. One could 
argue that one of the basic challenges of capitalist 
production, the creation efficient technology-labour 
combinations, has taken a new form, now that the 
dependency on local labour markets has diminished 
and information technologies facilitate organisational 
coordination over large distances. Consequently, global 
business corporations must constantly reconsider 
the organisation of their value chain, to see if a more 
efficient production regime is possible.
Thus, in socio-technical knowledge society the 
creation and management of efficient value chains has 
become a business in itself, including such tasks as 
the search for and contracting of the cheapest labour 
possible, and the integration of the dispersed activi-
ties into profitable products or services. These tasks 
are performed by a staff in which a large variety of old 
and new occupational roles are represented, and that is 
composed of people that can be typified as economic 
hit men (Perkins, 2004). 
The economic hit men (and women) act as the 
shock-troops of the socio-technical knowledge society, 
preparing the way for value chain improvements. Eco-
nomic hit men transform the poor majority of this world 
into an underpaid and disposable workforce, they force 
local firms to perform a certain business function and 
they manipulate governments into a cooperative atti-
tude. This job is performed by a large army of lawyers, 
financial specialists, anthropologists, interpreters, per-
sonnel officers, organisational advisors, diplomats and 
other great communicators. 
Next to this segment of professional value chain 
(re)designers, one can distinguish various workers who 
deal with the conditions for functional, spatial and tem-
poral integration, once the new organisational pathways 
have been opened up. IT-specialists are brought in to 
create the informational infrastructure, supply chain 
managers take care of an efficient flow of materials, 
and social managers make sure that all relevant pro-
duction activities are coordinated. Together, the value 
chain designers and managers shape a new techno-so-
cial system that is transgressing not only geographical 
but also political, legal and moral borders. 
One might argue that this new job-market depends 
on the existence of institutional vacuums and niches. 
Value chain designers search for places where labour 
laws are poor or lacking, where environmental rules 
are hardly enacted or where governmental authorities 
are willing to bypass legal and political restrictions. At 
the same time, however, value chain managers lay the 
basis for some degree of social integration, by creating 
functional interdependencies.
Trailblazers of the socio-cultural KS: 
language builders
The main objective of the trailblazers of the socio-
cultural knowledge society is the creation of ‘common 
ground’ and ‘trust’. The production and use of these 
(mostly) intangible commodities become more important 
where cultural fragmentation and the increasing length 
of value chains create an increasing danger of mistrust 
resulting from information asymmetries or cultural 
misunderstandings. The economic interaction between 
actors – producers as well as consumers – who are more 
distant in a cultural, geographical or organizational 
sense can be facilitated through a common unifying 
language, e.g. a shared set of images and words. 
The production of these languages is the task of 
what might be called the image builders. Out of an 
immense amount of culturally diverse meanings these 
image builders create common ground by selecting or 
inventing sets of images and words that for all the ac-
tors involved more or less represent the same ‘feeling’ 
or ‘thought’. In the designing process of products and 
services (and consequently indirectly in the design or 
reorganization of value chains) the image builders cre-
ate metaphors that, if successful, generate comparable 
feelings and thoughts among culturally diverse groups 
of consumers: a cross-cultural image of ‘love’ and ‘her-
oism’ in movies, of ‘quality’ in advertisements, and of 
‘justice’ in politics. Thus, amongst this segment of the 
socio-cultural knowledge elite we can find a wide va-
riety of old and new occupations: graphic designers, 
advertisers, social scientists, web designers, political 
advisers, and the like.
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Another group of image builders is involved in 
the designing process of the value chains themselves. 
Here, they create a language that facilitates the com-
munication, interaction and assessment between all the 
actors involved in the production of a good and service. 
Ideally, the language is negotiated in the initial phase 
of the collaboration by consultants and diplomats, and 
defines the accounting, auditing and benchmarking 
procedures for the remainder of the partnership pe-
riod. In many cases, however, the language needs to 
be revised time and again, since many concepts (‘ef-
ficiency’, ‘equity’, etc.) simply can not be caught in 
a lasting and stable language that can bridge all cul-
tural differences. This maintenance job is done by a 
second segment of the socio-cultural knowledge elite: 
the translators. These professionals however not only 
revise the language on a regular basis, they are also in-
volved in a continuing process of negotiation in which 
consultants, counsellors and mediators try to persuade 
unwilling partners to accept the language and the con-
sequences it generates. The success of the translators 
is of course highly dependent on interaction skills that 
take into account cultural differences, and on a reflex-
ive attitude towards the collaboration process.
Trailblazers of the techno-cultural KS: 
identity facilitators
The main objective of the knowledge society elite 
is the bridging of individual and cultural differences. 
These differences can be bridged by creating temporal 
(but inherently unstable) alliances between actors, 
like the socio-technical elite does, or by producing (or 
suggesting) common ground, as the socio-cultural elite 
tries. The differences can, however, also be overcome 
by the creation of instruments that allow the interaction 
and coexistence of divergent identities. This is the 
objective of techno-cultural knowledge elite. 
Since in a globalised and reflexive world indi-
viduals and groups can no longer derive their values, 
norms, and world view from a collective source, the 
fulfilment of one’s own identity or the cultivation of 
a group identity has become a critical and inescapable 
task. As Giddens argues, this task can not be accom-
plished without the aid of other identity-seeking in-
dividuals or groups. They serve as ‘mirrors’ and can 
provide answers to questions as what kind of actor 
one is to become, what kind of identity one is to de-
velop, and how one is supposed to express an identity 
(Giddens, 1991). In a daily, face-to-face setting, actors 
organise these confrontations in friendships, roman-
tic relations, and in the contacts with colleagues on 
the shop floor. On a higher level, the identity-seeking 
individuals and groups however need instruments to 
meet and mirror.
This collective quest for uniqueness has opened 
up a whole range of new avenues for communication 
in which an elite of techno-cultural professionals has 
taken the lead. They create the means by which indi-
viduals and groups can exchange their uniqueness and 
can find the elements they need to realise or model a 
(new) identity.
One section of the techno-cultural elite, the chan-
nellers, enable the communication between individu-
als and groups by the production of physical or virtual 
‘pipelines’, like cell phone and internet connections, 
chat boxes and the like. This task only partially in-
volves the actual invention of these high-tech com-
munication instruments themselves, though even for 
the techno-cultural elite a minimum of knowledge of 
the technological hypertext is essential. The main and 
most precarious mission of the channeller is however 
the channelling of the communication to the created 
channels by the destruction of the old ones and by 
making the new channels indispensable – or at least 
by suggesting that they are indispensable. Thus, by 
digitalizing books, maps, photographs and any other 
competing medium, internet providers, computer en-
gineers and software designers for instance outclass 
the older means of communication, and at the same 
time ‘channel’ the communications to their own pipe-
lines. 
In this sense, the channellers have an essential fea-
ture in common with a second segment of the techno-
cultural knowledge elite, the platformers. Both the 
channelers and the platformers try to make themselves 
indispensable by offering high-tech commodities to 
satisfy the most intimate need for self-reflection and 
self-fulfilment – for identity. In the case of the plat-
former this task is, however, much more complicated, 
since it is not confined to the connection of identity-
seeking individuals and groups by ‘simple’ pipelines. 
For the platformer, the secret of the knowledge-based 
economy lies in the invention of products that on the 
one hand are acceptable for a wide variety of cultur-
al groups and individuals as a means to express their 
uniqueness and at the same time can easily be produced 
in large quantities. This paradoxical task, that some-
what resembles the production of ‘fashion’ in indus-
trial society, can be fulfilled by the invention of a wide 
variety of high-tech products: standard blue jeans with 
unique tears and scars, cars that can be tuned to the 
individual taste, electronic devises to store individual 
music or photo collections, and standardised web logs 
to disclose one’s ever-changing identity. 
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Conclusion: 
meta business functions and the management of 
value chains
In this article, we claimed that the rise of the knowledge 
societies is accompanied by a fundamental ‘reorgani-
zation’ of economic value chains. However, this reor-
ganization is not simply a matter of the extension and/
or complication of economic ties. In many cases, value 
chains are becoming more extended and value-adding 
processes are becoming more complex and opaque, 
but these changes are no longer simply the outcome of 
ad hoc decisions by individual business men or com-
panies looking for ways to produce cheaper and more 
efficient. In the new global economy, these changes 
are the result of well-planned activities by specialised 
professionals.
With the advancement of the knowledge types, 
new business functions have emerged that diverge 
fundamentally from the functions we already knew. 
The economic hit men, the language builders, and the 
other new professionals that we have portrayed in the 
previous section not simply perform a certain value-
adding task in the overall manufacturing of a product 
or service, like the other and older professionals did 
and do – in a sense, their products are the value chains 
themselves. 
The new professionals directly or indirectly cre-
ate new value chains by linking or destroying existing 
ones, and breaking up others in to pieces in order to 
create new combinations. In this respect, the new pro-
fessionals perform a type of business function that did 
not existed before, and almost literally ‘exceeds’ all 
the other functions: they perform ‘meta business func-
tions’.
Contrary to the older ones the new professionals are 
not in any way linked to a certain geographical set-
ting or national community. They are, to paraphrase 
Anthony Giddens (1990, 1994a), the first real ‘dis-em-
bedded’ professionals, rooming virtually (and only in 
some cases physically) around the globe, re-embed-
ding themselves if necessary but always dis-embed-
ding when their job is done. Though all of the new 
professionals are the product and producer of a spe-
cific knowledge society, they are in a sense the ‘linking 
pins’ between the three knowledge society types in a 
narrow sense that we have conceptualise in this article. 
By actively managing value chains, they annihilate the 
social tissue of industrial society, but at the same time 
integrate the three emerging knowledge societies in 
an overall structure of interdependency – in a global 
knowledge society.
Notes
(1) See for the concepts of ‘business function’, ‘value chain’, 
‘outsourcing’, and ‘offshore outsourcing’ the glossary 
on the website of the WORKS-project: www.work-
sproject.be.
(2) Florida (2002) does however not make, as we do, a dis-
tinction between what might be called a ‘socio-cultural’ 
and a ‘techno-cultural’ creative class.
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